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Abstract
There is a budding controversy with the combat use of Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA). Also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), there is a
growing literature critiquing the use of RPAs, often using the pejorative
term “drone.” RPAs seem to get the blame for a variety of complaints
about policy and employment that have little to do with the airframe or
its processes. While all of the military functions of an RPA can and are
done by manned aircraft, the RPAs must endure additional scrutiny. The
decision to employ RPAs requires additional considerations at both the
strategic and operational levels of war. This article explores the strategic
issues that govern the decisions to employ RPAs in combat. The decision
to employ RPAs involves a variety of strategic and operational concerns
involving legal issues, technological constraints, operational efficiency,
and an interdependency upon information operations.
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the U.S. Air Force Academy, the U.S. Air Force, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
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Introduction 
On October 7, 2001, an MQ-1 lazily flew circles over Eastern Afghanistan, 
monitoring Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s compound. As people emerged from 
the compound, the MQ-1 followed a convoy of suspected senior Taliban leaders to 
a meeting place in Kandahar. Concerns over collateral damage led to a botched 
attack that left a few guards dead but failed to bag any leaders. In 2009, the U.S. 
Navy used a Scan Eagle to assist in the movie-famous rescue of Captain Phillips 
off of the coast of Somalia. A few years later, the United States provided short-
range Ravens to provide the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) a 
tactical advantage, helping contribute to al-Shabaab’s roll-back over the past 
three years. In 2013, French Harfangs and American MQ-1s provided 
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) support to the French Opération 
Serval in Mali. The capability to pinpoint enemy positions and track al-Qaida (of 
the Maghreb) movements provided the French a tremendous operational 
advantage.  
 
The above examples provide a snapshot of the versatility and efficacy of remotely 
piloted aircraft (RPA). At the operational level of war, assigning an aircraft to a 
specific mission is a process known as aircraft allocation. Allocation aligns the 
available resources against targets. Regardless of the desired effect (destroy, jam, 
or collect), the allocation process is essentially the same. While all aircraft are a 
part of this process, RPAs are held to a different standard than all of the other 
aircraft in the inventory. The additional scrutiny that RPAs receive during the 
missions has turned an operational process into a strategic decision. To the 
layman, the differentiation of a strategic versus an operational decision is a minor 
semantic squabble. To the warfighter, this bureaucratic reality represents a major 
paradigm shift for military decision makers and the planners that work for them.  
 
This paradigm shift to a strategic focus requires military decision makers to 
consider four key factors that influence decision on how and whether to employ 
RPAs for an operation: public perception, political risk, legal considerations, and 
military strategy. This study will analyze how each of these factors shapes the 
military decision making process for RPA employment. Finally, this study 
concludes with some observations on how these factors shape the military 
decision making process for limited military interventions, the approval process 
for the authorization of a military strikes, and future force structure planning. 
 
Public Perception 
Although popularly known as drones, the military refers to them as Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). In military parlance, 
the term “drone” is used for remotely controlled aircraft designed for target 
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practice use.1 The RPA term is a slightly superior description than UAV. 
Unmanned could incorrectly imply that the system has no man-in-the-loop and 
thus that this is some type of autonomous robotic killing machine. Plus, the 
“piloted” aspect highlights that the aircraft is not that of a hobbyist. Though it is 
not a foregone conclusion that the term RPA will fully replace its competitors, 
this article will use the term RPA to describe the entire military community of 
remotely controlled combat aircraft.  
 
Despite the military’s attempts to reimage this technology by changing the 
nomenclature to RPAs, the name change is unlikely to change public perception 
in the near term. Therefore, the military planner must assume that a certain 
segment of the public, both domestic and international, will continue to perceive 
this technology as killer robots. The planner must also consider that the public is 
largely unaware of variations between RPA aircraft. The planner should assume 
that the public will perceive all RPAs as lethal regardless of the actual weapons 
capability of the platform under consideration for employment. 
 
While RPAs are clearly not robots, there is justification for the media’s close 
association of RPAs with killing individual terrorists. This is logical since RPAs 
are the optimum platform for conducting counter-terrorism missions. 
Advancements in technology, improved capabilities for target discrimination, and 
limited risk of collateral damage made RPAs the weapon of choice for targeting 
High Value Individuals (HVI). Since 2004, RPAs conducted approximately 400 
strikes between Pakistan and Yemen.2 While the number of strikes per year is on 
a downward trend, this is more likely caused by a diminishing target set than by a 
perceived decreased utility in the RPA. The perception of RPAs as terrorist killers 
is also driven by the highly publicized, though supposedly sensitive, CIA 
operations over Pakistan. Since the CIA lacks fighters and bombers, the RPA is 
their primary weapon of choice for a counter-terror target. 
 
The military planner must also consider the perception of collateral damage. 
Because RPAs are the optimum choice for targeting terrorists who are often 
found in close proximity to civilians, there is a perception that RPAs are a 
collateral damage hazard. There are several classic anti-drone stories that are 
used to point out the technological evils of RPAs. One incident was the accidental 
killing of two-dozen Pakistani soldiers. On patrol in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), the Pakistanis were misidentified as extremist 
militants. Another example involved an RPA surveillance mission along the Iraq-
Turkey border. The RPA sensor operator noted the suspicious activity of a group 
                                                          
1 The military’s first drone for target practice was developed in the 1930s by the Naval 
Research Lab. 
2 “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” New American Foundation, October 30, 2014, 
available at http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis. 
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transiting from Iraq into Turkey. While the operator did not identify the group, 
the Turkish Air Force attacked, assuming that they were PKK militants 
infiltrating into Turkey. After the strike, it turned out that the group was not 
militants, but low-level criminals smuggling gasoline. Both of these anecdotes 
demonstrate the prospect of RPA strikes turning into collateral damage disasters. 
 
While collateral damage does occur, the reality is that technology has made RPAs 
the premium platform for both optimum target discrimination and minimum risk 
of collateral damage. Dynamic targeting is an inherently complex process used 
against time-sensitive targets. By definition, dynamic targeting means that there 
is a compressed timeline to locate and prosecute the target. Arguably, ground 
forces have superior target discrimination capabilities. However, ground forces 
have much less ability to respond to compressed timelines and typically involve 
significantly more risk for the force involved. While the relatively slow speed of 
RPAs can often be an operational hindrance, it provides a significant advantage 
to target discrimination relative to fast-moving jet fighters.  
 
In the case of fighters, target discrimination is often the judgment of a single 
individual. Ironically, most “unmanned” aircraft require a significant amount of 
manpower: a pilot, a sensor operator, and one or more sensor analysts. The 
sensor analyst is an intelligence expert with insights into cultural nuances and 
access to collaborating (or refuting) intelligence sources. Additionally, the 
decision to employ weapons is generally not delegated to any of these individuals. 
While this individual may have primary responsibility for target discrimination, 
the authority directing target engagement is a third party monitoring a live video 
feed. Target engagement authority often resides at the Air Operations Center 
(AOC), Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) or the Joint Special Air 
Operations Center (JSAOC). In some tactical situations, forward ground forces 
can monitor the live video via a remotely operated video-enhanced receiver 
(ROVER) or similar device. Despite this oversight, the friction of war still leads to 
errors that can result in friendly fire or civilian collateral damage.  
 
While armed RPAs also have significantly less risk of collateral damage, this does 
not necessarily mean that they do not cause collateral damage. But, when RPAs 
do cause collateral damage, it is likely to be less damage than alternative weapons 
platforms. The Hellfire missile carried by various RPAs is a smaller warhead than 
many alternative air-to-ground munitions. It contains a mere twenty pound 
explosive charge, tiny in comparison to the USAF’s other most commonly used 
air-to-ground missile, the AGM-65 Maverick, which houses a 126 pound 
warhead. Even so, the military planner should assume the continued public 
perception that the RPA is a collateral damage hazard. 
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The concept that one can mathematically compare the collateral damage caused 
by RPAs versus other strike aircraft is something of a chimera. Many RPA strikes 
occur in remote areas in which it is not practical to have a ground team to 
confirm the identity of the target post-strike. In some cases, al-Qaida or one of its 
affiliates does have forces on the ground in proximity to the strike site. It is not 
unusual for terrorist organizations to “stage” the site before journalists show up. 
“Staging” can vary from removing weapons to planting previously dead women 
and children. Surprisingly, when these photos hit the media, the United States 
tends to remain mute. The desire to protect intelligence sources often outweighs 
the desire to show proof that the target was indeed affiliated with extremist 
groups. In military circles, stories abound about Taliban efforts to avoid 
airstrikes. One anecdotal story involved the simulation of a funeral procession. 
But, instead of bodies, the coffins were loaded with weapons. Of course, there are 
cases in which RPAs have inadvertently killed civilians. Al-Qaida and other 
terrorist group propaganda encourage the false assumption that RPAs are 
somehow omnipotent. Because of these efforts, the death of civilians appears to 
the local population to be some sort of evil conspiracy to kill the innocent. 
Unfortunately, the efficacy of measuring the attitudes of the local population is 
problematic. Outsider access to the population is limited, leading to 
extrapolations and data of questionable reliability.3 
 
One of the major challenges of conducting RPA strikes in countries such as 
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia is an inability to obtain information dominance 
over the terrorist enemy. If al-Qaida can convince the local citizens that RPAs are 
robots, the United States’ lack of access to the local information networks makes 
it extremely difficult to counter the adversary’s narrative. Accidental civilian 
casualties plays into the adversary’s propaganda narrative that the United States 
views civilian deaths as “acceptable losses” to ensure the death of a terrorist and 
that the United States is not taking appropriate precautions to ensure that the 
“robots” do not kill civilians.4 In Iraq and Afghanistan, ground forces could 
conduct in-person apologies and provide monetary indemnification in an attempt 
to mitigate the potential backlash caused from collateral damage. But, in 
countries in which the United States lacks a physical presence and media injects, 
al-Qaida is able to gain the upper hand with propaganda, convincing the locals 
                                                          
3 C. Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenthaler, and William Miller, “The Drone War: Public 
Opposition to American Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” Political Science Quarterly 129:1 
(Spring 2014): 1-33. 
4 While rules of engagement vary across military operations, it is plausible that the 
importance of the target (i.e., terrorist group leader or senior military commander) might 
outweigh the potential collateral damage on the decision to strike.  
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that America is an “immoral bully” that carries out “indiscriminate violence 
against Muslims.”5 
 
This creates something of a catch 22 for military decision makers for employing 
RPAs in a counter-terrorism role in remote locations. One of the great advantages 
of the RPA is a reduction in physical presence and, therefore, risk to forces. But, 
the reduced physical presence results in a comparative disadvantage in the 
information campaign. Potentially, this could result in a net gain in militants. In 
order to be a net loss for the terrorist organization, the target needs to be more 
valuable than the theoretical new recruits. Based upon this calculus, these types 
of RPA strikes should only be conducted upon extremely valuable targets. Of 
course, this model can be manipulated based upon the subjective assessment of 
the value of the target and the assumptions made about the number of recruits 
that terrorists gain from an airstrike. Even so, having a model framework will 
assist in strike decisions for short-notice dynamic targeting situations.  
 
Political Risk 
The political risk associated with the employment of RPAs is a double-edged 
sword. Compared to manned aircraft, the RPA reduces the domestic political risk 
for involvement in a conflict because of the limited ramifications of a crash. For 
the casualty-averse public, there is no risk to the operator. For the cost-conscious 
Congress, there is no need for a massive and expensive rescue and recovery 
operation over areas where personnel recovery is difficult. From a strategic 
communications perspective, there is no risk of a humiliating “Blackhawk Down 
scenario” which will force the United States to reconsider its intervention policy. 
From an operational perspective, less political risk equates to additional 
flexibility. For example, during NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya, 
RPAs were the primary ISR aircraft that were allowed to go “feet dry” over Libya 
due to the potential risk to aircraft from Libyan air defenses.  
 
Arguably, the reduced political risk could encourage the United States and other 
countries with RPAs to consider military options more often than in the past.6 
Additionally, the negligible risk to military personnel will reduce Pentagon 
opposition to RPA-only military interventions. Whether or not this reduced 
political risk is a good thing largely depends upon an individual’s perspective on 
the role of the military, under what conditions the military should be used, and 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the military to conduct certain missions.  
 
                                                          
5 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2013), available 
at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139454/audrey-kurth-cronin/why-drones-
fail. 
6 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2013), available at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139453/daniel-byman/why-drones-work. 
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Beyond risk to the pilot, RPAs also represent reduced political risk to partner 
countries. The requirement for deployed personnel, equipment, supporting 
logistics, and ramp space for an RPA is significantly less than that of its fighter or 
manned ISR counterpart. This means that deployments to austere locations such 
as the Sahel Desert (just south of the Sahara) or a remote island in the 
Philippines are comparatively lower profile and less of a burden on the local 
infrastructure. Additionally, while not stealthy, RPAs are considerably less 
obvious than the majority of manned ISR aircraft such as the P-3, RC-135, MC-
12, and U-28. In sum, this can equate to a higher probability of approval by the 
host government and less resistance from the local U.S. Ambassador who is the 
de facto responsible agent for the security of Americans in country. While a 
concern over local infrastructure may seem petty, even small deployments can 
quickly overwhelm a small economy.  
 
Finally, RPAs have less political risk because they are cheaper to replace than 
their fighter or ISR counterparts. However, cost comparisons of military aircraft 
are extremely tricky. The Pilatus PC-12, the civilian version of the U-28, costs 
about the same as an MQ-1. But, this fails to account for the equipment upgrades 
that the U-28 has over the PC-12. Plus, the U-28’s loiter time pales in comparison 
with the MQ-1, making a per-airframe cost comparison somewhat misleading. An 
MQ-9 costs about the same as an F-16 and about half as much as an F-15. 
Unfortunately, this cost comparison lost meaning when the production lines were 
halted for the F-15 and F-16. An M-9 costs about one tenth of an F-22. But, the 
roles of the two aircraft differ so significantly that the comparison no longer 
makes sense. Plus, there is no manned aircraft equivalent to the smaller RPAs 
such as the Raven and the Scan Eagle.  
 
RPAs are also perceived as having lower operating costs. This may be accurate for 
a cost per flight hour comparison. However, these comparisons fail to account for 
variations in on-station time and the support costs for logistics, manpower, and 
communications. While the support costs for a small RPA such as a Raven are 
very low, the manpower and communication requirements for a large RPA such 
as an MQ-9 are significant. Conversely, manned aircraft with less range and loiter 
time could spend a significant amount of flight time simply transiting to and from 
the target, limiting its on-station usefulness. While political risk is a major 
concern for the military planner, critics of U.S. foreign policy tend to downplay 
risk and focus upon the legality of RPA strikes.  
 
Legal Considerations 
Legal factors that shape the strategic decision to employ RPAs primarily focus on 
lethality and sovereignty. A variety of authors present an anti-RPA bias because 
they are opposed to the targeting of individual non-state actors outside of conflict 
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zones.7 This opposition is rooted in a legal debate about the use of lethal force 
against non-state actors.8 The disagreement centers around whether or not a 
country can be at war with a loosely defined organization (vice a formally 
recognized country). While this is an important intellectual debate on just war 
theory, it is only tangentially related to RPAs. Because RPAs are the primary tool 
for targeting non-state actors, political opposition to targeting non-state actors 
transitions into opposition to the use of RPAs. However, this seems to incorrectly 
assume that halting the use of RPAs will translate into a stop to targeting non-
state actors. A variety of weapons platforms can be used to target non-state 
actors. In fact, just war theory is platform agnostic. If it is just to kill someone 
with a B-52, then it is equally just to kill that person with an MQ-9. Of course, the 
opposite is also true: killing with an RPA does not enjoy some type of legal 
loophole that discourages killing by some other type of military platform. 
 
From a military perspective, the legal framework for lethal action against non-
state actors is based upon the Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF).9 Under 
the AUMF, the decision making process about whether or not an individual can 
legally be killed is independent from the platform used to deliver the killing blow. 
Throughout the Global War on Terror, a wide variety of ground-based and air-
based methods were used to kill or capture terrorists. Of course, air-centric 
methods tend to lack a capture component. Even so, air methods are not limited 
to RPAs. F-16s, F-15Es, F-18s, and B-52s have delivered ordnance upon key 
terrorists. There is little ethical justification to argue that killing someone with a 
fighter jet is morally different than killing someone with a Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft.10  
 
Closely related to the issue of lethality is the issue of sovereignty. Normally, the 
use of lethal force upon another sovereign country’s territory without its 
permission is considered an act of war under international law. Certainly, not all 
legally defined acts of war actually lead to war; however, they can be the cause of 
prickly international incidents and unwanted tensions between otherwise 
friendly countries. Considering the media and public perception of RPAs, the 
decision to request RPA over-flight (either armed or unarmed) of another 
                                                          
7 Turse, Nick and Tom Engelhardt, Terminator Planet (San Bernadino: Dispatch Books, 
2012). 
8 Steven Groves, “Drone Strikes: The Legality of U.S. Targeting Terrorists Abroad," 
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder on Terrorism, April 10, 2013, available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-
targeting-terrorists-abroad#_ftnref22; Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with 
Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009,” Notre Dame Legal Studies 
Research Paper 09-43 (July 2010), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144. 
9 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Public Law 107–40, September 14, 2001. 
10 Strawser, Bradley Jay (ed.), Killing by Remote Control (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 7-17. 
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country is not a task considered lightly. While sovereignty was never a serious 
concern for RPA operations over Afghanistan, an ongoing war zone, sovereignty 
is a major concern for operations conducted in Pakistan, Yemen, Mali, and since 
the United States departure in 2011, Iraq. 
 
The approving sovereign country has a variety of approval options. It may choose 
to grant approval publicly or privately. In the case of a private or secret approval, 
it is possible that many of the country’s government workers are not aware of the 
unconfirmed official approval. The sovereign country has the option to require 
permission be requested for each individual strike or can grant blanket 
permission for all strikes. In the case of a private approval, the sovereign could 
follow a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. In such a case, the striking country does not 
ask for specific permissions, does not acknowledge the strikes publicly, and the 
targeted country can publicly express outrage at the violation of its sovereignty. 
Of course, the private approval route has some negative secondary effects that 
play into the propaganda of the enemy organization under attack because it 
exacerbates the perception that the strikes are illegal. Since private approval is 
difficult for third parties to disprove, reliance upon private approval reinforces an 
ambiguous international precedent. The mere potential of private approval 
provides the RPA with plausible deniability and limits a country’s liability for 
perceived or actual violations of sovereignty.  
 
Even the non-lethal employment of RPAs requires legal considerations. Current 
legal interpretations of the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Process, the Arms 
Export Control Act, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the 
Missile Technology Control Regime restrict the ability of the U.S. military to sell 
or give RPAs to its allies. In those rare cases where such security cooperation is 
allowed, legal considerations often prevent those RPAs from being armed. For 
example, during military operations in Afghanistan and Libya, NATO contributed 
United States produced RPAs. The quality and skill level was similar to that of the 
U.S. operated RPAs. The unarmed NATO RPAs were valuable ISR platforms. But, 
the lack of weapons hindered the overall operational flexibility of the air 
campaign. For both lethal and non-lethal employment, as innovation continues 
to out-pace regulation, RPAs will continue to receive additional public and 
political scrutiny as a stopgap measure to fill the perceived void of ambiguous 
law.  
 
Military Strategy 
At the operational level of war, the employment of RPAs is a microcosm of 
strategic decisions on how to best run an air campaign. The choice of aircraft 
apportionment is often a choice of priorities between providing close air support 
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(CAS) and targeting adversary leadership. Apportionment involves an alignment 
of aircraft capabilities with desired effects or targets.  
 
Aircraft capabilities vary greatly across the RPA community. The major platforms 
in the RPA community include (from big to small, long range to short range): 
Group 5—RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-9 Reaper; Group 4—MQ-1 Predator; Group 3—
RQ-7 Shadow; Group 2—Scan Eagle; and Group 1—RQ-11 Raven. Despite public 
perception, most RPAs cannot employ lethal force. Only the MQ-1 and MQ-9 
have the coveted (or dreaded depending upon your perspective) dual ISR-strike 
role. The MQ-1 can carry two AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles. The MQ-9 
can carry two 500-pound bombs and four Hellfire missiles.11 This gives the MQ-9 
the equivalent firepower of an F-16 against small targets such as vehicles and 
troops. However, the MQ-9 is at a comparative disadvantage when targeting large 
targets or hardened facilities. While lethal force is limited to only a few platforms, 
all of the RPAs have an ISR function. The majority has a Full Motion Video 
(FMV) capability. The oddity in the community is the RQ-4 that is more of a U-2 
style snap and shoot imagery aircraft. In fact, there is no stick or yoke for the 
Global Hawk. It is flown by mouse clicks and keyboard instructions, which 
severely reduces its flexibility, as airborne re-tasking is slow and laborious.  
 
Unfortunately, the group classification system mentioned about is inadequate for 
operational planning. The groups are based upon weight, operating altitude, and 
airspeed. While this classification is somewhat useful for differentiating Federal 
Aviation Administration rules and airspace restrictions, the Group classification 
has limited utility for operational planning. To make it more complicated, 
services use their own classification systems. The U.S. Air Force tiers are 
essentially based upon altitude (low, medium, high) with a special tier for low 
observable RPA. Conversely, the U.S. Army tier system is based upon range. 
However, none of these classification systems are useful to the military planner 
since they omit key factors such as sortie duration, payload options (intelligence 
or weapons capabilities), and plug and play variations. This could potentially lead 
to confusion or misunderstanding of asset capability when requesting an RPA, 
assigning it to a mission, or understanding platform readiness.  
 
RPA support to CAS places emphasis on winning today’s battles and minimizing 
friendly casualties by supporting troops in contact. This concept fits the classic 
airpower arguments of J.C. Slessor and Robert Pape.12 In this role, the RPA can 
act as both a CAS platform and as a Forward Air Controller-Airborne (FAC-A). 
                                                          
11 Typically either the laser guided GBU-12 or the GPS-assisted GBU-38 Joint Direct 
Attach Munition. 
12 Slessor, J.C., Air Power and Armies (London: Oxford University Press, 1936); Pape, 
Robert, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell: Cornell University 
Press, 1996). 
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On the other end of the airpower spectrum is John Warden’s argument that 
airpower should focus on the enemy leadership with the goal of winning the 
campaign via decapitation, vice tactical battles in support of ground troops.13 Of 
course, military operations attempt to find a balance between these two extremes, 
typically apportioning aircraft between strategic leadership (or other central rings 
of Warden’s Theory, including lines of communication and infrastructure) and 
tactical targets closer to the front lines of battle, by a weight-of-effort percentage. 
However, this choice becomes especially problematic for those operations in 
which RPAs are in short supply.  
 
Surprisingly, the majority of military operations are conducted with RPAs in 
short supply. During the heyday of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military 
relied heavily upon Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Funds to ramp up 
additional wartime capabilities that far exceeded its annual budget. This allowed 
the military to temporarily fund additional ISR aircraft including RPAs. 
Sustainment (primarily operations and maintenance costs) of the additional 
RPAs was entirely dependent upon continuation of the OCO funds in future 
budgets. Starting in 2001, the USAF cannibalized its test and training equipment 
and crews in order to maximize the availability to RPAs for combat operations. 
This reduced training capability equated to additional strain on existing crews. 
The USAF began to unwind this decade-long knot in 2011 despite the insatiable 
appetites of the Combatant Commanders for this valuable asset. As the U.S. 
government budget got tighter, DOD re-planned its force structure based upon a 
future with no OCO funds. The easy solution was to off-ramp anything that was 
not in the original (non-OCO funded) budget, which caused the RPA community 
to take a significant hit.  
 
Prospects for the immediate future of RPAs look dim as “the Air Force is 
signaling a strategic choice, consistent with its budget, to sacrifice ‘lower-end’ 
capabilities like Predators and Reapers for stealthy aircraft able to operate in 
contested air environments against sophisticated air-defense threats.”14 Arguably, 
the decision is reminiscent of the post-Vietnam military backlash against all 
things counterinsurgency, and a refocus on potential existential threats to the 
United States. The Air Staff perceives its future force structure under tightening 
budgets as a dichotomous decision: either prepare for the most likely, but least 
direct threat to the United States (e.g. small wars and counterinsurgencies) or 
prepare for the less likely, but most dangerous scenario. The choice was to focus 
on the most dangerous: win an air war against a peer competitor with advanced 
air defenses and a robust air force. Since RPA survivability is suspect in such an 
environment, reducing RPAs was a logical step.  
                                                          
13 John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal (Spring 1995): 40-55. 
14 Paul Scharre, “Is the U.S. Air Force Set for a ‘Crash Landing?’,” The National Interest, 
September 11, 2014. 
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To determine which military operations get the shrinking pool of RPAs, the Joint 
Staff runs a decision-making process known as Global Force Management 
Allocation Process (GFMAP). The decision is often a myriad of apparently 
dichotomous choices: specific near-term threats versus long-term ambiguous 
threats, counter-terrorism (CT) versus counterinsurgency (COIN), and the global 
war on terror versus other operational missions. This decision can be portrayed 
in terms of protecting American soldiers under fire today, versus hunting 
terrorists like al-Qaida (and more recently, ISIS) in remote parts of the world that 
present a long-term, non-specific threat to the United States. Special Operations 
Command’s (SOCOM) role as the leader of the war against terrorists naturally 
puts them in competition with conventional missions owned by the regional 
Combatant Commanders.  
 
From an RPA perspective, the CT versus COIN debate is a mirror image of the 
Warden versus Pape debate for air campaign planning. While the COIN mission 
must find a balance between Warden and Pape, the CT mission has the luxury of 
ignoring Pape altogether and focusing on enemy commanders. George Mason 
University Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that drones are a strategic 
failure, in part, due to a misunderstanding of the nuanced difference between CT 
and COIN. A deep reading of Cronin indicates she is arguing that al Qaida should 
be handled as a COIN problem, not a CT problem, because decapitation is not 
working; emphasis should be placed on countering individual recruitment, not 
targeting senior leadership. This is a bold, though not unique, argument. Still, the 
crux of the problem is that RPAs cannot conduct COIN without friendly ground 
forces in the vicinity of the enemy. In those cases where the United States is 
unwilling to commit ground forces or unable to find a willing third party, CT will 
remain the de facto strategy.  
 
Of course, Remotely Piloted Aircraft are not the perfect choice for every mission. 
RPAs have a number of drawbacks that must be considered before selecting them 
for employment. There are a variety of missions for which the RPA may not be 
the best choice. When an RPA is beyond line-of-sight from a ground controller, it 
is possible to lose control of the aircraft. Similarly, many RPAs have more 
restrictive weather limitations than their manned counterparts. While these 
factors are often considered acceptable risk for most operations, high stakes 
missions may need to consider a back-up plan.  
 
It is interesting to note that while military strategy is the primary component 
driving the typical asset allocation process, it is only one component of many that 
goes into the decision-making process to employ Remotely Piloted Aircraft. 
Arguably, for RPAs military strategy is probably the least important factor 
compared to public perception, political risk, and legal considerations. Of course, 
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a good military strategist will consider all of these factors when requesting an 
RPA asset for a particular operation or mission.  
 
Conclusion 
The employment of RPAs requires a paradigm shift for the military decision 
making process. Military strategy and operational art is an important factor in 
determining if and how to employ RPAs. Yet, the military decision maker and 
planners must view RPA employment from a strategic perspective. Military 
planners can take advantage of the legal ambiguities of RPAs to improve 
plausible deniability and limit potential liability. However, RPA employment 
comes with a strategic communications challenge since it feeds the adversary 
narrative that RPA actions are illegal and immoral. While RPAs present less 
political risk and potential collateral damage than alternative platforms, planners 
should consider that the public would continue to perceive RPA strikes as prone 
to causing civilian deaths. In the near term, these factors suggest an increased 
likelihood of RPA-only military interventions for operations that are on the 
“fringe” of U.S. national security interests. But these factors also present a major 
obstacle to future procurement of additional RPAs. The additional public and 
political scrutiny puts RPAs at a comparative disadvantage to other advanced 
aircraft such as the F-35. 
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